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Labor Mobility, Redistribution, and
Pension Reform in Europe
Alain Jousten and Pierre Pestieau
3.1 Introduction
The future of the public pension systems in the European (EU) is pres-
ently a widely discussed topic. Unfortunately, the debate can be qualiﬁed
as a rather shallow one, because it addresses only a limited number of
questions. In the United States, on the other hand, a great deal of writ-
ing—some of it quite inﬂuential—is devoted to the old age crisis even
though the crisis there is much less severe than in most of the member
states of the EU. To understand this statement, one should keep in mind
that compared to the majority of European countries, the United States
devotes considerably less resources to unfunded public pension systems.
Also, U.S. Social Security—the main public retirement program—can rely
on a non-negligible trust fund. Furthermore, private funded pension
schemes are widespread, and people generally retire at a much higher
eﬀective retirement age. Even the most pessimistic forecast of the ﬁnances
of the U.S. Social Security program seem rosy relative to what can be
reasonably expected in a number of European countries. In that respect,
Aaron (Aaron and Shoven 1999) notes that “even if no legislative changes
were made, 70 to 75 percent of beneﬁts provided under current law could
be paid indeﬁnitely,” and adds, “To suggest that social security is in crisis
is to engage in Orwellian doublespeak” (55). One surely could not write
that about most EU countries.
On the issue of the viability of the public systems, European economists
and politicians can be classiﬁed into two broad categories: those who
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85think that the present systems are more or less ﬁt for the future, and those
who think that we are heading for serious ﬁnancial trouble—if not in the
short, at least in the medium run. On the face of this opposition, there
seems to be little common ground between the two groups. However, most
of the analysts seem to agree on at least one issue, namely, the neglect of
individuals’ mobility under future pension systems. Usually, critics tend
to consider the future of an isolated pension system or, at best, of a given
country’s multiple systems while ignoring or underestimating the potential
for increased intercountry and intersystem mobility. In so doing, the critics
neglect an entire spectrum of issues that have the potential to induce large
changes in the returns individuals can expect from their pension contribu-
tions. Furthermore, the consequences for the public systems themselves
are also far from negligible.
In this paper, we discuss the main characteristics of European manda-
tory pension systems and the implications of increasing factor mobility for
these systems. Although it is undoubtedly true that labor mobility between
countries is rather limited, it is more than likely that it will increase. In the
past, individuals’ mobility was inhibited not only by cultural and language
diﬀerences, but also (to a non-negligible extent) by regulatory and legal
limitations. At present, these limitations on job mobility are being disman-
tled in the wave of reduction of public intervention and the creation of a
true single European market. Obvious exceptions are some government
jobs that we could call “strategic,” as well as occupations in the legal pro-
fession. Cultural and language barriers are also becoming less relevant as
people are exposed more frequently to foreign languages and cultures from
a very young age.
The results of these changes can already be felt today, particularly in
some segments of the workforce. For example, young college and univer-
sity graduates are more mobile than their less-educated counterparts, for
multiple reasons. First, they generally have better language training and
more frequent exposure to other cultures (e.g., through the Erasmus and
Socrates student exchange programs of the EU). Second, they generally
hold jobs that are easier to relocate, due either to the characteristics of the
job itself (e.g., a computer programmer telecommuting to work) or to an
international working environment (e.g., a customer support machine-tool
specialist with a European or even worldwide customer base).1
Hence, we must study not only the question of whether labor mobility
will increase and thus will have an impact on the viability of the pension
systems, but also the question of whether this mobility will continue to
evolve diﬀerently for diﬀerent population segments, and what the conse-
quences of such an evolution will be.
In the present paper, we focus on the issue of mobility at the beginning
1. On the contrary, immigration from outside the EU tends to cater to unskilled workers
(but this is not the concern of this paper).
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there is room for strategic relocation of individuals at the beginning of the
working life, and whether such mobility has the potential to change the
redistributive patterns (both inter- and intragenerational) of the various
national pension systems.
Relocating at the beginning of the working life is not the only kind of
mobility with implications for social security. A worker can relocate in the
middle of the working life, and the portability of social security and other
pensions schemes can foster or (more probably) restrict this type of mobil-
ity. One may also relocate at the end of one’s working life. Retirees may be
attracted to warmer weather or cheaper living expenses and accordingly
move to another country. This type of mobility may have some conse-
quence on public revenue, depending on the tax structure. Finally, there is
the cross-border mobility, which occurs when an individual works and
lives in two adjacent countries. We will also deal with these alternative
types of mobility.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 3.2 we illustrate some
of the core features of European pension systems and compare them to
those of the United States when useful. We also discuss some issues relat-
ing to mobility in the middle and at the end of the working life. In section
3.3, we present some insights into which paths European governments can
take toward reform. Section 3.4 represents the main thrust of the paper
and deals with the direct implications of labor mobility on various provi-
sions of pension systems. We use ﬁndings from the literature on ﬁscal fed-
eralism to illustrate some of the potential eﬀects of mobility. Section 3.5
addresses the types of mobility within the life cycle other than that at the
beginning of the working life. Finally, we conclude the paper with some
comments in section 3.6.
3.2 Characteristics of the European Pension Systems
Before proceeding further, we must note four points that are worth em-
phasizing. They pertain to the diﬀerences between pension systems in the
Federal United States and the Confederal EU. First, compared to the U.S.
federal social security structure, pensions in the EU are the responsibility
of national governments. Second, within the EU, there are important dif-
ferences in the size and the organization of pension schemes across coun-
tries. Third, in the whole debate over the future of social security in the
United States, the scope is limited to the national borders. In the EU, there
is a well-founded concern that economic and political integration aﬀects
the survival prospect of each national pension system. Finally, labor
mobility is known to be negligible within the EU; even within each na-
tional entity, interregional mobility is lower than across states in the
United States.
The ﬁrst and fundamental pillar of European pension systems is manda-
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as-you-go (PAYGO) deﬁned beneﬁt scheme. Individuals contribute to the
scheme today; in return they receive beneﬁts when retired that are ﬁnanced
by future generations’ contributions and based on some pension computa-
tion formula that is not necessarily a function of past contributions.
Diﬀering system characteristics across EU countries are their size and
their redistributiveness. For example, the French and German systems are
more than twice as important as the British system in terms of their share
of gross domestic product (GDP)—close to 13 percent each, as opposed
to 5.5 in the United Kingdom.2 Furthermore, although in some countries
these systems account for a large fraction of the total income of the elderly,
in other countries they do not (see Disney and Johnson 2001).
Not surprisingly, the second pillar (occupational pensions) is quasi-
inexistent in the countries that have a very strong ﬁrst pillar; the same is
also true of arrangements belonging to the third pillar (individual retire-
ment savings). More generally, it is fair to say that the presence of private
pension arrangements is an inverse function of the generosity of the public
system. In the absence of public provision, individuals must try to secure
their old age income through private market arrangements, be they com-
pulsory or discretionary.
As opposed to the public PAYGO systems, occupational pensions are
generally organized on a fully funded basis. A notable exception are the
French unfunded second-tier pensions, which are both deﬁned beneﬁt and
based entirely on a PAYGO principle, and hence belong to the ﬁrst rather
than the second pillar. Another characteristic of occupational pension
plans is that they can be either deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) or deﬁned contribu-
tion (DC), in which the pension is a direct function of past contributions.
Third-pillar schemes, in turn, are generally fully funded and based entirely
on DC basis.
From the point of view of redistribution, public pension systems are
markedly diﬀerent among the various EU countries. Two main levels of
redistribution must be distinguished. The PAYGO nature of European
public pension systems has lead to what is known as the free lunch given
away to past and current generations of retirees. This free lunch implies
an implicit government debt, the so-called social security wealth, which is
particularly high in countries with generous pension schemes. In Germany
and in France, this implicit debt is much higher than the explicit govern-
ment debt. The French ratio of debt to GDP is just below the Maastricht
ceiling of 60 percent. If the implicit government debt is added in, the over-
all ratio amounts to about 160 percent (Roseveare et al. 1996). This redis-
tribution from younger to older generations clearly varies across European
countries and is not without consequences as factor mobility increases.
2. The corresponding ﬁgure for the public Social Security retirement program in the
United States is 4.6 percent.
88 Alain Jousten and Pierre PestieauAnother source of variation across European countries is the extent of
intragenerational redistribution. In some countries there is a tight link be-
tween contributions and pension beneﬁts according to the insurance prin-
ciple of getting an actuarially fair return. In some other countries this
link is loose. Indeed, in countries (such as France and Germany) with
contribution-related beneﬁts, social security does not eﬀect any redistribu-
tion; one sometimes speaks of a Bismarckian regime. On the contrary, in
countries with redistributive beneﬁt rules the replacement ratio declines as
income increases. In these countries (such as the Netherlands or the
United Kingdom), workers truly consider that their contributions are like
taxes—namely, that the contributions do not entitle them to an equipro-
portionate beneﬁt.
Intragenerational redistribution can take on diﬀerent forms, however;
for example, early retirement provisions can also cause major redistribu-
tion of income. Indeed, in countries such as Belgium, where implicit taxes
on continuing work beyond the time of ﬁrst eligibility for early retirement
beneﬁts is close to 80 percent, the system operates a clear redistribution
toward individuals’ retiring early (Pestieau and Stijns 1999).
The eﬀective retirement age also varies across European countries. It is
indeed striking to observe that in Europe, the current and expected demo-
graphic parameters are not terribly divergent. The statutory retirement
ages are also quite similar. What varies more is eﬀective retirement. To
capture this notion, Gruber and Wise (1999) have introduced the concept
of unused labor capacity between the ages of ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-ﬁve. This
capacity ranges from 67 percent for Belgium to 35 percent for Sweden (it
is 37 percent in the United States and 22 percent in Japan). This is due
mainly to a number of both implicit and explicit incentives to early retire-
ment (so-called “actuarial” adjustments), which vary wildly among Euro-
pean countries. These incentives are pervasive in the social security pro-
grams of countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands,
where the eﬀective retirement age is quite low.
Furthermore, some European countries have essentially opted for a uni-
versal national pension system, whereas others have preferred to set up
multiple systems. As a consequence, the study of the question of inter- and
intragenerational redistribution ﬁnds itself complicated by the sometimes
quite opposing degrees of redistribution of the various national systems.
Altogether, the result of these features is that in most EU countries,
elderly households experience an unprecendented standard of living rela-
tive to the other age groups and relative to the past. Poverty rates are also
extremely low among today’s retirees.
3.3 Reforming the Pension Systems
We have described the main characteristics of the European pension
systems, which appear rather heterogeneous in four respects: size, burden
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age. These characteristics combined with population aging and declining
productivity growth explain the old age crisis that is clearly more acute in
countries with generous schemes. Until now, each national government has
more or less successfully addressed this crisis. In Cremer and Pestieau
(2000), it is argued that the old age crisis does not come solely from the
combination of demographic aging and PAYGO schemes. By appropri-
ately adjusting the key parameters of social security systems (namely, the
replacement rates, the payroll taxes, and the retirement age) while fostering
individual or collective saving for retirement, governments can avert the
old age crisis. The real issue is also and mainly political. Reforms must go
through the political process, in which majority voting and vested interests
too often make impossible the implementation of reforms otherwise opti-
mal from the standpoint of both intra- and intergenerational equity.
In that respect, two remarks are in order. In countries that have under-
taken reforms, the approach has been to rely on the grandfathering for-
mula, precisely to circumvent paralyzing interest groups. This can have an
unbearable cost. Furthermore, it is well admitted that a total shift from
PAYGO to a fully funded system is not feasible. If the transition generation
is to be compensated for abandoning PAYGO by issuing an appropriate
public debt, and if the beneﬁt rule is unchanged so as to keep the extent
of intragenerational redistribution constant, then such a shift would be
neutral. The government that would undertake such a reform would run
an increased deﬁcit, which would be exactly oﬀset by the increase in pri-
vate savings from the surplus of the new pension plans. The national sav-
ing rate would not increase. In eﬀect, the reform would simply convert an
implicit obligation of the government to future retirees into explicit debt.
That said, most reforms, whether implemented or contemplated, include
the development of some fully funded schemes acting as supplement (and
not a substitute) for the existing PAYGO ﬁrst pillars.
Discussion of the viability of existing pension systems and alternative
ways of reforming them is most often conducted in the setting of national
borders with no or low labor mobility. The implicit assumption is that
although physical capital has proven to be quite mobile, labor may not be
so mobile. Language is often the most often-cited barrier to migration, but
diﬀering customs, traditions, and preferences matter as well. Governments
themselves may implement policies that inhibit labor mobility: regulation
of house prices and rents, subsidies of declining industries, residency
linked social beneﬁts. Ineﬃcient property markets make moving an expen-
sive proposition. One expects that these various barriers to mobility will
progressively fall under the speciﬁc pressure of European integration and
the more general pressure of economic globalization. It is therefore rele-
vant to investigate the implications of labor mobility for the old age crisis.
We thus have an interesting question, namely, whether a shift from
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labor mobility. As already noted before, a “neutral” shift from a PAYGO
to a fully funded system has no eﬀect in the absence of mobility. The same
proposition implies that, if before the reform there is what we call a migra-
tion equilibrium, after a neutral reform, this equilibrium is unchanged. Any
individual will face the same lifetime utility before and after the reform;
there are thus no reasons for moving.
Clearly, if the reform is not perfectly neutral from the viewpoint of inter-
or intragenerational redistribution, then a migration equilibrium will result
according to the argument developed in the next section. If the reform
does not fully compensate the transition generation of retirees, the young
generation of workers will face a lighter liability in the reform country
(through lower implicit or explicit government debt). Retirees cannot
move out but workers from other countries can be attracted by the reform
country and move in. Hence, the changing intergenerational redistribution
patterns induce mobility. Furthermore, recall that before the reform any
individual worker was indiﬀerent between staying in his or her home coun-
try and moving to the reform country. If the reform does not restitute the
same redistributive pattern as that prevailing before (i.e., if it does not
reduce the amount of intragenerational redistribution), high-wage workers
can be attracted to move to the reform country and low-wage workers to
m o v eo u to fi t .
3.4 The Implications of Labor Mobility in the European Union
As announced, we now turn to the expected eﬀects of labor mobility
on the way countries organize their social security systems. As already
mentioned, we realize that we are far from smooth mobility across EU
countries, although we believe that this will eventually be achieved. In any
case, in a competitive market economy, capital mobility implies equalized
rates of return and hence equality of wages for a given skill level. Yet—
and this is important for the problem at hand—there is a diﬀerence be-
tween equal wage rates and equal lifetime utilities. That diﬀerence may
arise from diﬀerent factors, notably national indebtedness and unfunded
pension systems that may beneﬁt households when introduced and burden
them thereafter.
We consider autarkic countries, each having its own speciﬁc pension
policy, and see what happens when we allow for factor mobility. Two set-
tings can be envisioned. In the ﬁrst, countries are passive; they do not want
to change their approach to ﬁnancing (PAYGO vs. fully funding), the role
of supplementary pension, or the type of beneﬁt rule (Bismarckian or Bev-
eridgean). As shown by Cremer and Pestieau (2000) in a two-country
model, such passive behavior can have a pathological outcome, with all
high-income individuals or all low-income individuals conglomerating in
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countries react to migration and reform their pension systems according
to their planners’ social welfare function or through the political process.
We will adopt the latter setting and assume that each country has a
social planner with a utilitarian objective. This seems to be the prevailing
assumption in the literature. First we look at the eﬀect of mobility on the
intragenerationally redistributive dimension of pension provisions, and
then at the eﬀect of mobility on the intergenerationally redistributive di-
mension, namely, the size of the social security wealth.
3.4.1 Intragenerational Redistribution
The prevailing view is that a redistribution policy is best administered
by the central government, in our case the EU. Accordingly, decentralized
redistribution policies cause some kind of adverse selection. In a world of
perfect mobility, we would expect individual countries with redistributive
programs to attract poor households from less-redistributive neighboring
countries and to repel rich households who must pay for the programs.
These reactions eventually make it impossible to pursue any redistribution
at the national level except through some kind of cooperation among the
member states. We expect these general predictions to hold even in the
presence of a limited mobility of individuals belonging to some income
and social groups.
The canonical model used is naturally simple. It involves two countries
producing an output using two types of workers, skilled and unskilled.
Skilled workers are assumed to be mobile and unskilled workers are immo-
bile (the opposite assumption does not change the resulting conclusion).
There is a social security scheme that aﬀects some redistribution between
the two types of individuals. In the absence of mobility, each country im-
plements the redistribution that ﬁts its welfare criterion. When there is
mobility, such a policy is bound by the constraint that the lifetime utility
of mobile workers be identical. In other words, any move toward a more
generous system in a country attracts migration from the other countries.
In the literature (Cremer, Fourgeaud, et al. 1996; Wellisch 2000) one
usually contrasts redistributive social security conducted both without and
with coordination. The former case reﬂects the current step of the EU;
the latter a still far-fetched possibility. Three ﬁndings are standard. First,
uncoordinated national redistributive policies result in migration distor-
tions when countries are diﬀerent. In other words, the eﬃciency required
so that the marginal productivity of mobile workers be equated is violated;
a corollary to this ﬁnding is that if one country values redistribution more
than the other, it will end up with relatively less-skilled workers and less
redistribution than in autarky. The second ﬁnding is that if both countries
are identical in all respects, the equilibrium is symmetric and the allocation
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remains. The third ﬁnding is that a coordinated increase in the redistribu-
tive payroll tax rate in the two regions increases social welfare. Note that
the same conclusion holds if mobility is only partial. The only case in
which mobility is neutral is that of an actuarially fair pension system.
3.4.2 Intergenerational Redistribution
Let us now look at diﬀerences in social security wealth, or, expressed
diﬀerently, in intergenerational redistribution. The issue is the same as that
of diﬀerent levels of public debt. The Maastricht Treaty introduced a ceil-
ing of 60 percent on the ratio of debt to GDP and adopted a narrow deﬁ-
nition of public debt. It is clear, however, that the reasons that led to adopt-
ing that ceiling apply as well to the implicit debt generated by generous
PAYGO pension systems. The major reason for imposing such a ceiling
was the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which is independent of
whether there is labor mobility. The rationale is simple: When a country
deeply endebted through standard debt or through PAYGO social security
joins a fully integrated economic union, it makes its partners partially pay
for it.
If there is labor mobility, diﬀerentials in the net beneﬁts that individuals
can expect from public pensions along with other policies alter the payoﬀ
to migration and can inﬂuence the international allocation of labor. Wil-
dasin (1999) estimates the change in the present value of lifetime wealth
that results from switching from one public pension program to another
for representative workers in seven EU countries. He shows that moving
between certain countries can result in an increase of 15 percent or even
more in lifetime wealth. As he points out, diﬀerentials in net beneﬁts create
ﬁscal incentives for ineﬃcient labor allocation. We expect increased mobil-
i t yt ol e a dt oar e d u c t i o ni nd i ﬀerences in intergenerational redistribution
over time.
Consider two countries, identical in all respects, that contemplate adopt-
ing a PAYGO system for, say, compensating the current generation of retir-
ees for hardship that prevented them from saving for retirement. It is clear
that with mobility of the young generation, there will be a “race to the
bottom,” namely, toward a lower amount of such pension provision than
decided in autarky. Naturally, we assume that the young generation antici-
pates that a PAYGO system relative to a fully funded system implies a cost
that depends on the gap between the rate of return on capital and the rate
of growth of the economy.
Consider an equally realistic setting in which two countries are identical
in all respects but toward intergenerational redistribution. One relies more
than the other on PAYGO to ﬁnance its pension system. What happens
when their borders are open to possible migration of the young? One can
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one.3 The only way this outﬂow can be stopped is by decreasing the burden
of such a debt, and this implies taxing the currently retired and immobile
generation. Note that if on top of this, the population is aging and hence
the dependency ratio is going up, so there is an additional incentive for the
young generation to move out from PAYGO countries to fully funded ones.
As a consequence, countries with a population dedicated to the PAYGO
principle and willing to resist even partial shifts toward fully funded
schemes can be forced to reform their systems because of the mobility-
induced tax competition.
Finally, let us analyze the implication of diﬀerences in retirement ages
in European countries once we allow for increased labor mobility. Exactly
as for the degrees of intra- and intergenerational redistribution, we would
expect increased mobility to render social security systems less redistribu-
tive with respect to retirement age. By this, we do not understand that
retirement ages will necessarily tend toward one identical age of retirement
all across the EU. Rather, we would expect there to be a schedule of retire-
ment ages and beneﬁt packages that people of diﬀerent survival probabili-
ties could choose from. For example, early retirement would go together
with reduced beneﬁts, late retirement with increased monthly beneﬁts. In-
dividuals would then select the best package for themselves, depending on
their own estimates of the survival probabilities they face.
3.4.3 Is There a Race to the Bottom?
In the two previous subsections, we have argued that with some factor
mobility there would be convergence toward less spending on PAYGO pro-
visions and less redistribution in retirement beneﬁts. This expected evolu-
tion, often labeled a “race to the bottom,” thus concerns PAYGO and ﬂat-
rate beneﬁt systems. Do we witness such a race to the bottom?
When looking at the evolution of old age beneﬁts (aggregate or per-
beneﬁciary) over the last decades, it is surprising to see that they have not
decreased in most EU countries. During the 1990–96 period, the ratio of
old age beneﬁts to GDP has increased everywhere but in the Netherlands.
Does that mean that the danger of social dumping in the area of social
security is not to be taken seriously? Not really. This question calls for a
number of qualiﬁcations. First, it is possible that there are some lags in the
reaction of mobile agents to increased mobility. Second, the cost of mobil-
3. This issue has lately received much attention. See Bra ¨uminger (1999), Pemberton (1999),
Meier (2000), Crettez, Michel, and Vidal (1996). If national governments are passive and the
only factors of production are mobile labor and mobile capital, then the more indebted coun-
try disappears. To avoid such an extreme solution, one must introduce ﬁxed factors such as
land or real estate. Alternatively, one must allow for national government action toward a
rapid reduction in the national debt or the PAYGO pensions at the expense of the immo-
bile retirees.
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the language issue or the ﬁnancial cost of moving. The job market is still
relatively closed. More importantly, the same reasons that explain why
each country adopted a given type of social security (PAYGO or fully
funded, Bismarckian or Beveridgean) can explain why people do not
move. It is possible that they are attached to particular type of social pro-
tection, and in that respect, they are not as opportunist as assumed in
models of ﬁscal competition. This point holds only for the mobility of net
contributors and not for that of those beneﬁtting from redistribution. Also,
it noteworthy to consider recent work that identiﬁes previously unrecog-
nized beneﬁcial eﬀects of competition among governments. It can be
shown that with imperfect competition (Wilson 1999) or with majority
voting (Cremer and Pestieau 1998), public spending and redistribution can
very well not decrease as a result of factor mobility. Finally, it is interesting
to note that countries that redistribute intragenerationally quite often do
not rely exclusively on PAYGO systems. The converse holds true for coun-
tries that do not redistribute intragenerationally. Hence, the two redistrib-
utive eﬀects would oﬀset each other.
These diﬀerent arguments may explain why the eﬀects of mobility on
redistribution have so far been limited. It is, however, important to realize
that in the future they can loose their strength. For example, the impedi-
ments to mobility induced by ﬁscal or social policies are likely to disappear
in the future with the integration not only of European economies but also
of national mentalities and cultures.
3.5 Mobility within the Life Cycle
In the previous sections, we implicitly assume that individuals contem-
plate migration at the beginning of their life cycles. At that early stage,
they are supposed to be able to weight the pluses and minuses of alterna-
tive locations. In the real world, there are other types of mobility; workers
can move within the working period or at the beginning of the retirement
period. Exactly as for mobility at the beginning of the working life, such
relocations can be triggered by factors pertaining to job oﬀers on hand,
family matters, health conditions, and health coverage—which are factors
exogenous to the social security system—or, alternatively, by strategic con-
siderations created by the social security system itself.
3.5.1 Mobility at Retirement
First we consider mobility at the beginning of the retirement period.
Both public and private retirement schemes all across the EU allow indi-
viduals to receive their social security beneﬁts independently of their place
of residence in the EU, and sometimes even far beyond the reaches of
the Union. In this respect, it is indeed not uncommon to observe retirees
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it for health reasons or simply because they want to see the sun. This is
not uncommon but surely is not as widespread as in the United States
(think of the situation currently observed in both Florida and Arizona). If
a large number of retirees from Nordic countries would settle in southern
countries, there would be a loss in the tax base for the former and a gain
for the latter. This is so because the elderly essentially are taxed indirectly
rather than directly. It is indeed well known that social security income is
not as heavily taxed as labor income. Furthermore, interest income is
hardly taxed in the EU. Value-added tax thus is frequently the only major
source of tax income from the elderly. This eﬀect on the tax base would be
reinforced by the presence of diﬀerential mobility according to income. It
is more than likely that the people moving south would have a higher aver-
age income than those staying behind in the north. Hence, this reduction
of the tax base in northern countries would also be accompanied by a shift
in the overall tax burden from the old to the young and from the rich to
the poor, with all its consequences on the mobility of the young.
This ﬁnding is underlined when we introduce the welfare component of
public pensions beneﬁts—namely, means-tested old age beneﬁts—into the
picture. Eligibility for this type of income is based strictly on a residency
criterion. Therefore, assuming a more generous system of means-tested
beneﬁts in the north of Europe, we would expect poor people to move
north as a reaction to the more generous social security system. Again,
this condition assumes that national governments do not react. Expect-
edly, they will not remain passive and will adjust their welfare systems and
their tax structures to counter unpleasant eﬀects of retirees’ mobility.
3.5.2 Mobility during the Working Period
Turning to the concept of mobility within the working period, we must
introduce several distinctions. First of all, we must distinguish the ﬁrst
from the second and third pillars. Second, we also must distinguish mobil-
ity concerning the workplace from mobility concerning the place of resi-
dence; here we consider the latter. Shortly after the Treaty of Rome, mem-
ber states began to develop a system of multilateral coordination for social
insurance legislation.4 The coordination so achieved was aimed at estab-
lishing equality of treatment between nationals and nonnationals (but be-
longing to the EU) in social insurance. This has proved successful because
it allows individuals to take up residence or employment in any country
of the EU without undue loss of social insurance rights—that is, without
being at signiﬁcant disadvantage, compared with those who remained in
their own countries throughout their entire working lives. This system of
multilateral coordination applies to pension provisions, but only to the
ﬁrst pillar. When this system was developed, it was believed that, at a later
4. This is enacted through Regulation 1408/71 and 574/72; see EC (1994).
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put in place for supplementary pensions, whether based on legislation or
on contractual arrangements. However, it quickly turned out that it was
not easy to overcome the obstacles to freedom of movement posed by
the pattern of existing supplementary pensions in the EU, which are both
complex and diversiﬁed. Patterns are complex in the sense that even within
a given country, there is a large diversity of pension schemes that are often
interwoven with particular rules of the tax code. Furthermore, tax treat-
ment of pensions is not necessarily stable, and thus introduces a high level
of segmentation. The system is also diversiﬁed in the sense that, in some
countries, private supplementary pensions represent the bulk of the pen-
sion rights of individuals, whereas in other countries they represent only a
trickle. The distinction between deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) schemes and deﬁned
contribution (DC) schemes is also important here, because it is much eas-
ier to transfer balances of DC plans rather than accumulated pension
rights in DB plans.
Over the last three decades, the Commission (as well as the private sec-
tor, the insurance industry, and the pension fund industry) have searched
for some solutions, but obstacles remains today and hence freedom of
movement of workers covered by supplementary pensions is restricted.
For our purpose, the implication is clear: There is more freedom between
countries with dominant mandatory social security plans than between
countries with mixed arrangements. Let us add that in the latter, the ﬁrst
pillar is sometimes means-tested, implying that residency restrictions exist
even after retirement (as already mentioned).
It is clear that when considering a pension system (both ﬁrst and second
pillars) that does not slow mobility, it is tempting to generalize DB ap-
proaches. In the ﬁrst pillar, this would be made possible by adopting the
so-called “national accounts pension system” that is now used in Italy and
Sweden. Such a policy would clearly facilitate labor mobility in particular
within an enlarged EU. Indeed, with a more and more heterogeneous eco-
nomic union, the current arrangements concerning mandatory systems
could become increasingly diﬃcult to implement. At the same time, it is
clear that a generalized move toward DC systems makes them less redis-
tributive—a serious problem that assistance programs (means-tested min-
imal pensions) can solve only partially.
3.5.3 Cross-Border Mobility
We now turn to a frequently neglected issue related to mobility during
the working life. Indeed, we must distinguish the mobility of workers with
respect to their places of work from that with respect to their places of
residence.5 In Belgium, for example, the rules of the public social security
5. The ﬁrst type of mobility is qualiﬁed as travail frontalier in French (i.e., people crossing
the border to get to work).
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the place of residence. Indeed, for workers changing both the residence
and the place of work, the standard EU rules on cross-border mobility
apply: The individual accumulates fractions of pension rights in diﬀerent
countries according to the proportion of his or her professional career
spent contributing to a given system. Consider the case of a worker who
instead of moving his place of residence to another country only commutes
to work abroad. In this case, he still generates pension rights abroad in
proportion to the time spent in every foreign system. However, in parallel,
he accumulates ﬁctive or imputed pension rights in the Belgian social secu-
rity system: ﬁctive wages—which are close to national average wages—
are imputed into his Belgian earnings record, independently of the real
observed earnings of the individual. If, at the time of retirement, the for-
eign pension is smaller than the ﬁctive Belgian pension corresponding to
the same period of time, the Belgian social security system then pays the
diﬀerence to the individual. Hence, the Belgian system illustrates that it is
possible to introduce an additional margin for maneuvering, namely, a
separation of the choice of the residence and the workplace. This distinc-
tion is especially important for small countries such as the Benelux coun-
tries, where almost anyone can work in a diﬀerent country than the one in
which he or she resides. The same is obviously true for border regions of
larger countries.
This particularity of the Belgian system, however, also reemphasizes one
weakness of the entire current regulatory framework for mobility: namely,
its focus on ﬁrst-pillar pensions. To illustrate this point in the extreme, con-
sider the case of a Belgian resident working in the Netherlands. At retire-
ment, the worker will have signiﬁcant Dutch pension entitlements, some
large fraction of them under the form of occupational private pensions.
However, in its computation of the potential pension complement, the Bel-
gian social security administration does not take the Dutch occupational
pension into account and hence pays out a much larger supplement than
would have been the case had all kinds of pension income been taken
into account.
3.6 Conclusions
We began this paper by showing that members of the EU have con-
trasting pensions systems, particularly with respect to redistribution. Such
a setting is likely not sustainable, given factor mobility. Capital mobility
that is high and labor mobility that is still negligible (except for highly
qualiﬁed workers) imply that eventually there will be some convergence
toward less redistribution, both between generations and across house-
holds. Pension systems, particularly generous ones, face a tough dilemma:
adjust or perish.
Having some governments forced to reduce their debt, both explicit and
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for public ﬁnances. However, pressure to reduce the redistributiveness of
social security, particularly toward low-income retirees, is by no means
desirable. Even if the overall level of poverty among elderly people is quite
low in the EU, there is a great deal of variability between member coun-
tries. One may therefore fear that a race to the bottom on social security
beneﬁts will lead all EU countries to experience the higher poverty rates
among the elderly that we presently know only in countries such as the
United Kingdom or Portugal.
In that respect, the idea of developing a European safety net for the
elderly could be seriously envisioned. Indeed, there is little doubt that the
elderly are the most vulnerable group of the population. This again raises
the crucial question of whether European governments take the social di-
mensions of the EU seriously. As Atkinson (1995) points out, the main
problems limiting individual national governments to provide eﬀective so-
cial protection are “those arising from political pressure—a political econ-
omy, rather than a migratory, constraint on national policy” (9). One can
easily speculate that such political pressure is much stronger at the level
of the EU. To put it another way, one has the feeling that a number of
national governments use the excuse of ﬁscal competition to explain their
failure to push for eﬀective social protection at both the national and
Union levels.
The Maastricht Treaty implied a mandatory reduction of the public debt
in countries such as Belgium and Italy. Another interpretation of this re-
duction is to consider it as a reaction to increasing mobility in Europe.
Even if those countries are perhaps unwilling to abolish their PAYGO sys-
tems altogether, they still must lower the burden on their young, mobile
workers in the face of increasing tax competition.
Two ﬁnal remarks conclude: First, this paper has focused on labor mo-
bility within the EU. There is an even more challenging mobility, that
which results from immigration ﬂows from outside the EU, particularly
from Eastern Europe. The reality—or even more so, the potentiality—of
these ﬂows is likely to induce individual national government to reform
their social security systems toward the insurance principal, with entitle-
mentsbasedonpastworkandpastcontributions(seeMichel,Pestieau,and
Vidal 1998). Finally, even for those concerned by the threat of economic in-
tegration on eﬀective social protection, it is crucial to improve the portabil-
ity of supplementary pension schemes within and across EU countries.
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Comment Michael Burda
This paper addresses a complex array of issues that has captured the atten-
tion of policy makers across Europe. In the domain of pension systems
Michael Burda is professor of economics at Humboldt University of Berlin.
100 Alain Jousten and Pierre Pestieauand the pension crisis, Europe diﬀers from the United States in obvious
ways. First, unlike the United States, Europe does not yet constitute a
nation in any practical sense of the word, and probably will not for at
least another half-century. Second, although pensions remain a national
responsibility, economic integration and labor mobility are already pan-
European phenomena. Labor mobility has a direct impact on the way pen-
sions function and are ﬁnanced. Third, labor mobility is joined by increas-
ing capital mobility and product market integration as potential mecha-
nisms of economic integration. As Mundell (1957) argued, the latter two
are generally substitutes for labor mobility and could, in principle, allevi-
ate if not remove the urgency of labor mobility’s threat to Europe’s na-
tional pension systems.
Jousten and Pestieau describe the pension system of the representative
European economy as primarily national pay-as-you-go (PAYGO), by vir-
tue of its strong emphasis of the ﬁrst pillar (public pensions, which have
become increasingly easy to transfer across intra-European Union bor-
ders). Company pensions are fragmented and are diﬃcult to vest. The
authors’ point is that the coming pension crisis in Europe, brought about
by the same deteriorating demographics and declining productivity growth
observed in the United States, will be exacerbated by heterogeneity in pro-
gram generosity, burden on future generations, and degree of redistribu-
tion due to higher replacement rates and early retirement. The authors
argue against a total shift to funded systems on the grounds that it is not
feasible. Their main message is that, to the extent that pension reform is
not neutral, mobility of labor in Europe may induce severe diﬃculties on
its own. Marginal households will induce a forced convergence or even a
race to the bottom among competing nations. This could eliminate redis-
tributional aspects of pension systems, taken by the authors to be a desid-
eratum. A central implication is that pan-European coordination of pen-
sion and, more generally, taxation policy is necessary to implement
redistribution aims. The point is a familiar one, and applies to all available
national mechanisms of redistribution, such as cash transfers and tax
credits.
My ﬁrst remark deals with the empirical, as opposed to the theoretical,
relevance of labor mobility in Europe to the pension crisis. Implicit in the
discussion is the Roy-Borjas model of mobility, in which heterogeneity of
returns to spatial mobility lead agents to “vote with their feet” and choose
those economies in which the net return is the largest. Generally, this
means that low-skilled workers migrate to countries with generous safety
nets and redistributive systems, whereas high-productivity workers mi-
grate away from them. What I missed in the paper is empirical evidence
that this is an important phenomenon. How important is (or was) “welfare
shopping” in the United States? Using the Roy-Borjas model, one would
conclude that European countries with more generous pension systems
and social safety nets sow the seeds of their own destruction. However, is
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such behavior? The fact that a number of European nations are parties to
the Schengen Agreement without explicit convergence of social policy is
evidence that the marginal worker is far from considering the decision to
migrate, and the observed ﬂows are too weak to matter. Merely asserting
that marginal workers enforce an arbitrage condition is not enough, be-
cause a no-proﬁt condition is observationally equivalent to an equilibrium
in which no mobility occurs because no one wants to be mobile. Due either
to ﬁxed costs or option values of waiting, modern migration theory gener-
ally predicts a zone of inaction for wages, within which no migration oc-
curs despite higher lifetime utility abroad; in this case, the marginal anal-
ysis, which gives rise to the results referenced by the authors, is of limited
usefulness. A good example of this is East-West German migration, which
remains a trickle despite a wage gap in 2000 of roughly 25 percent.
The overwhelming empirical evidence suggests that Europeans are im-
mobile. Even in a fully integrated environment, Europeans simply do not
move. This is due partly to their current demographic situation: Europeans
are older and live in more homogeneous populations. Mobility declines
sharply with age. Language diﬀerences militate against the migration de-
cision. In addition to these factors, Europeans view local amenities as a
strongly normal good, so that the income eﬀect of local prosperity de-
presses migration considerably (see Faini and Venturini 2000). It is a red
herring to attribute Europeans’ behavior to institutions. European low
mobility derives primarily from preferences, as intranational migration be-
havior clearly substantiates. In a democracy, economic institutions are a
reﬂection of national tastes.
To illustrate how striking the diﬀerences can be, consider table 3C.1,
which compares unemployment rates of cities (1995) in Louisiana with
those in the Bundesla ¨nder (federal states) of Germany (1995). The rather
tight homogeneity of rates in the former stands in stark contrast to the
variance of the latter, and is remarkable, given substantial averaging-out
of local labor market areas in Germany (for the states at least), and given
that the public transport infrastructure is much more developed in Ger-
many than in Louisiana.
An interesting question that is left unaddressed by the authors is the
extent to which increased immigration from outside the European Union
(EU) might change European “traditions.” Guest workers are mobile al-
most by deﬁnition; once inside Europe and with the rights of EU citizens,
they may become the enforcer of the marginal migrant equilibrium condi-
tion described by Jousten and Pestieau. It should be recalled, however,
that older labor market participants tend unconditionally to be the least
mobile and therefore pose the least threat to the redistributional element
described (early retirement).
My second comment concerns the equivalence of product market inte-
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goods-market integration can be seen as substitutes for labor mobility.
These two mechanisms can force labor costs into line with no active migra-
tion, and therefore with no additional ﬁscal burdens. If this does not hap-
pen, ﬁrms will exit and jobs will be destroyed until equilibrium is reached.
It is useful to remind ourselves that the demand for labor is not inelastic
in the medium to long run; the Marshall-Hicks rule predicts that capital
mobility and product market competition increase the elasticity of labor
demand, and put more pressure on governments to design employment-
friendly social safety policies. Rather than as racing to the bottom, the
examples of Italy and Belgium could be interpreted as prudent reactions
to tightening ﬁscal constraints as tax-driven labor-cost wedges raise unem-
ployment levels (increasing costs of social security) and lower the tax base
(due to the destruction of jobs). It turns out, incidentally, that evidence
for a race to the bottom in the EU remains scanty, as documented in Ber-
tola, Boeri, and Nicoletti (2001).
Table 3C.1 Regional Unemployment: German Federal States versus U.S. State of
Louisiana, 1995

























Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1999) and Louisiana Depart-
ment of Labor.
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importance of European pensions’ third pillar (i.e., private provisions),
which can be seen as (1) a tacit mechanism for scaling back redistribution
in the system (ﬁrst pillar), and (2) a driving force for the transferability of
pensions. The third pillar may involve many more families in Europe than
in the United States, because European household saving rates are signiﬁ-
cantly higher. One reason frequently given for the boom in European stock
markets during the late 1990s is that households are taking note of these
problems and are acquiring shares as insurance against future shortfalls in
the public pension system.
Fourth, the authors focus too much on redistribution in my view and
not enough on the size of the pie. The most important life-savers of pen-
sion systems are economic growth and concomitant labor force participa-
tion. David Wise, in his work with Gruber and others, documents a strong
negative correlation between eﬀective taxation and labor force participa-
tion, especially among older men just before retirement. Examples from
Holland, Denmark, and Ireland support this point. The possibility that
both could be jointly endogenous is real and has been demonstrated in
Eastern Europe, where unemployment of older workers with unsuitable
human capital for a market economy was reduced by massive early retire-
ment (Hungary and East Germany are prominent examples). Govern-
ments faced limited ﬁnancing options for this policy because the proﬁts of
state enterprises were no longer available and income taxes were not yet
implemented. They ended up taxing labor at rates that correspond to the
higher end of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment) Europe (Boeri, Burda, and Ko ¨llo ¨ 1998). This makes it clear that
early retirement as a mechanism of redistribution is a slippery slope that
can lead to a low participation, high tax, and high unemployment equilib-
rium, making the region or nation a potential candidate for handouts from
the EU—hardly a palatable option.
Finally, although the paper makes a number of important claims, I can-
not hide my disappointment at the poor documentation of the empirical
extent of migration’s eﬀect on pensions (i.e., the lack of hard tables and
ﬁgures). The migration numbers, although low, must still provide some
support for the authors’ arguments about increasing mobility among the
young, the educated, the non-EU nationals, and so on, which are pre-
sented in the paper without any quantitative evidence. It was disappoint-
ing that one of the key predictions of the paper—that mobility among
economies with dominant ﬁrst-pillar systems should be signiﬁcantly higher
than among less coordinated and harmonized countries emphasizing
second-pillar systems—was never put to an econometric test, although
this would have been rather straightforward.
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Discussion Summary
Horst Siebert proposed to distinguish two organizational issues, namely,
how to organize the schemes of insurance and how to deﬁne membership
in these schemes. With respect to the ﬁrst issue, he argued that especially
in the ﬁrst pillar the territoriality principle, that is, organization on a na-
tional basis, would be the only viable option, because a pan-European
method of social insurance would be too complicated. As to the question
of who should be a mandatory member in the ﬁrst-pillar system, he sug-
gested that one think of applying the Cassis-de-Dijon verdict to the na-
tional insurance schemes, at least as an intellectual device, in order to
show the impact. Such a regime would mean that individuals could choose
to which national systems they want to belong. This, according to Siebert,
would probably result in adjustments of the national systems and reduced
heterogeneity, because the systems could not stand the mobility of people.
He added that uncoupling the pensions from the work contract, in the
sense that pensions would be related to contributions and not to earnings,
would increase the ﬂexibility of the system under the European concept,
provided contributors accrued rights in the ﬁrst and second pillars that
they can take along across national borders. Siebert noted that taking
along the rights could require subsidies deﬁned on the EU level, but that
one should be careful not to open up a new category of subsidies in order
to increase the mobility of people.
Martin Feldstein remarked that switching between two national systems
seems to be a very complicated issue, partly because the systems are not
proportional. He wondered why the solution toward a pan-European pen-
sion system is not to have deﬁned contribution (DC) plans. As an illustra-
tion of how to avoid the problems of mobility, he argued that in a system
with notional DC plans, people working in each country made contribu-
tions to their account and in the end each government would pay beneﬁts
based on the years that were contributed and on the notional rate of return
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Pierre Pestieau replied that the way beneﬁts are computed in the case of
cross-border mobility is quite fair and that there is not much room for
strategic mobility. Alain Jousten added that, although portability would
obviously be improved by introducing DC plans, problems would not be
resolved altogether because DC plans are also usually interwoven with
diﬀerent parts of the tax code in the diﬀerent countries.
Assar Lindbeck pointed out that the argument that grandfathers should
pay because they were overcompensated confronts the dilemma that there
is a trade-oﬀ between good rules and stable rules. Even if it was a mistake
to design pension systems in a way that old generations receive six times
what they paid in many countries, it would be problematic to change the
rules when people reach sixty-ﬁve years of age, because many persons
might have based their past economic decisions on those rules. He sug-
gested one take into account the fact that rules may be bad, but stable rules
have an advantage in society. Edward Palmer remarked that one reason for
overcompensating old generations in our systems has been that many of
them went through two world wars, a depression, and so forth. He noted
that this era has passed and that Sweden has moved to notional accounts
and ﬁnancial accounts only, adding that he sees no reason why that type
of combination could not be employed all over Europe. Alain Jousten re-
sponded that the focus should not only be justice toward the old genera-
tion, but also justice toward the young generation, which would justify
levying at least some of the burden on the old generations as well. He
agreed only to some degree to the argument of a free lunch as compensa-
tion for two world wars, as he noticed that in many countries high-income
workers were compensated more for the war than low-income workers.
Assar Lindbeck questioned the proposition in the paper that redistribu-
tion should be centralized on a European level and suggested that people
should be allowed to vote with their feet. John McHale remarked that in
the real world the redistribution that takes place is determined in the polit-
ical process, and that it is easy to write down political economy models in
which the amount of redistribution taking place is excessive relative to any
given social welfare function. In such a framework, he argued, mobility
can act as a disciplining device, promoting a better social welfare outcome
and, consequently, it is not self-evident that redistribution should move to
the central level. Pierre Pestieau answered that the paper simply repro-
duces the state of the art in public ﬁnance and that he would not endorse
any kind of harmonized social security system.
Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supan argued that the problems of mobility are much eas-
ier to handle under a funded system than in a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
system, simply because in a funded system there is capital that one can
take along much more easily than the claims on human capital. He
stressed that the current social security wealth in a funded system is always
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system is always ill deﬁned even in a notional account system, essentially
because the markets are diﬀerent. He added some qualiﬁcations, namely
that while portability of corporate pensions in the Netherlands was en-
forced recently, ﬁrm pensions in Germany are still often not portable at
all, particularly in the reserve account system. He called for regulations to
foster portability, because this could not be left to the market due to a
complicated game of stick and carrot between employer and employees,
as well as the interest employers have to bind workers to their company.
Ignazio Visco also emphasized the importance of regulating the portability
of pensions, which could be accomplished at the central European level,
and stressed that increasing competition between open funds rather than
closed occupational funds would have very positive eﬀects. Martin Feld-
stein questioned the necessity of regulation and argued in favor of freedom
of private agents to contract in any way they want.
David A. Wise noted that twenty years ago in the United States most
ﬁrm pensions were deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions with provisions not un-
like those in the social security systems in Europe and with a considerable
degree of variation. He reported that while these diﬀerent provisions do
not seem to have had a major impact on job choice, they seem to have
been important with respect to mobility later on, typically encouraging
employees to stay until some retirement age and giving an enormous incen-
tive to leave afterward. Based on the evidence that twenty years later at
least three-fourths of contributions to pension funds go to DC plans that
have none of these incentive eﬀects with respect to mobility, he concludes
that limitations on the freedom of choice have been removed.
The importance of the federal issue was emphasized by Georges de
Menil, who argued that it might become one of the major forces pushing
European pension reform ahead. He noted that in a situation of system
competition there is always the choice either to collude, which means cen-
tralized regulation, or to compete. Although, due to limited actual labor
mobility, only a few people might be involved, he argued that the institu-
tion of the European Court of Justice can be expected to force govern-
ments to change regulations that represent obstacles to mobility and vio-
late the European treaties. He added that labor mobility is not necessary
to induce institutional competition but that it is suﬃc i e n tt oh a v ec a p i t a l
mobility, which undisputably is realized, at least since the monetary union.
Assar Lindbeck raised the issue that when looking at the low incidence
of labor mobility in Europe it is necessary to look at the microeconomic
incentives and that a situation is not reasonable in which contributions to
a pension system in one country are lost when people move to another
country. He proposed a system in which it is possible for an individual to
carry his compulsory retirement savings with him. Lindbeck added that in
his view the discussant underestimates the extent of labor mobility in the
Labor Mobility, Redistribution, and Pension Reform in Europe 107United States in view of diﬀerent welfare payments, as it is very diﬃcult
to explain the ﬂooding from southern states in the United States to some
northern large cities like New York from one unemployment situation to
another without emphasizing that the welfare payments are ﬁve or six
times as high in the state of New York as in Louisiana. The notion of very
low labor mobility in Europe was challenged by Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supan, who
argued that in addition to the regional mobility—which might change in
the future as well—there is the dimension of sectoral mobility within a
region, which is of greater and increasing importance. Given that people
are expected to move increasingly between diﬀerent jobs, he argued in
favor of a funded system, because patchwork life histories are much easier
to accommodate here than in a PAYGO system.
As an illustration of what may come about in some countries in Europe,
Jeﬀrey Liebman reported on the evidence in the United States with respect
to the distributional implications of immigration, stating that the group
that currently gets the highest rate of return in the Social Security system
are Hispanic Americans, because disproportionally they are immigrants
that come into the United States part of the way through their career. As
a reaction to this, there had been a lot of pressure to reduce the beneﬁts
that are available to the immigrants. Pierre Pestieau observed that not only
actual mobility but also the threat of mobility matters and noted that in a
pure symmetric Nash equilibrium, mobility has an impact even if no one
moves. He also endorsed the view that capital mobility is a kind of substi-
tute, and underlined the conclusion in the paper that as a result there is a
drive toward less PAYGO and less redistribution.
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